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I. INTRODUCTION
Driving to see her boyfriend one clear October day, Carla Correa approached a
Baltimore intersection in her Honda Civic. As she approached, the light turned
yellow, and Correa quickly slammed on her brakes. Moments later, a large truck
rear-ended her, completely wrecking her Civic. Why would Correa choose to stop so
quickly instead of simply coasting through the yellow light? The answer lies in a
tiny box perched on a post above the intersection. Inside the box is the dark
omnipresent lens of a red-light camera, watching over the intersection like the
proverbial “Big Brother.” Correa explained that the intersection had a “quick yellow
light” and “when [she] saw the yellow, [she] freaked out.”1 She stated, “Everytime I
see the red-light camera, I’m terrified by it.”2
It appears that attitudes and fears like Ms. Correa’s are prevalent among the
nation’s drivers. A Washington Post study reported that the amount of traffic
accidents increased at red-light intersections in the nation’s capital.3 The study also
found that crashes resulting in injuries and fatalities had increased by 81% after
installing red-light cameras at an intersection.4 Although camera proponents tout
their safety benefits, the real purpose is often revenue based. When a municipality
chooses to issue tickets with the goal of generating revenue, what stops
municipalities and the companies they contract with from issuing as many tickets as
possible without safeguarding the rights of citizens?
While the example above took place in Maryland, the same types of traffic
cameras are being used in the City of Cleveland. In fact, when former Mayor Jane
Campbell proposed that the City of Cleveland install red-light cameras, she saw them
as a way to close a serious budget gap.5 In 2004, Cleveland was confronted with the
largest general fund deficit in over twenty years.6 While some measures were made
to decrease spending, new sources of revenue were needed to close the deficit.7 It
was in response to this deficit, that Mayor Campbell proposed the use of red-light
1
Jonathan Miller, With Cameras on the Corner, Your Ticket is in the Mail, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 6, 2005, at G1.
2

Id.

3

Del Quentin Wilber & Derek Willis, D.C. Red-Light Cameras Fail to Reduce Accidents,
WASH. POST, Oct. 4, 2005, at A1.
4

Id.

5

Id.

6
CITY OF CLEVELAND, 2005 BUDGET BOOK 1 (2005) (noting that a lagging economy, utility
increases, soaring health care costs, and increase in the wages paid to labor contributed to this
deficit). In response, the mayor took an $11,000 reduction in salary and greatly reduced
general fund spending. Id. However, the city’s finances remained strained and new sources of
revenue were needed. Id.
7

See generally id.
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and speeding cameras.8 As Campbell noted in the city’s 2005 budget, “[t]hroughout
the country, cities with red-light cameras raised significant dollars even in the first
year of operation.”9 She predicted that in the first year of operation, the cameras
would net the city $6.5 million.10 However, the proposal was met with skepticism by
both city council members and residents.11 Councilman Kevin Conwell suggested
that the mayor was more concerned about raising revenue that making the streets
safer for drivers.12 Councilman Joe Cimperman harshly criticized the camera plan,
stating “[m]aybe we should worry about real economic development rather than
nickel and diming commuters.”13
The Ohio Constitution establishes the principle of home rule, which allows
municipalities to “exercise all powers of local self-government.”14 Under this power,
municipalities have the power to pass ordinances that regulate citizens’ behavior.15
However, as the Ohio Supreme Court has established, home rule is violated when a
municipal ordinance conflicts with a general law of the Ohio Revised Code.16 The
Ohio Revised Code contains a comprehensive system of traffic laws and establishes
that violations of those laws are criminal offenses.17 Cleveland’s ordinance enforces
speeding and red-light violations as civil offenses.18 Therefore, under the body of
law established by the Supreme Court, Cleveland’s ordinance conflicts with the Ohio
Revised Code.19 This Note argues that Cleveland’s traffic cameras violate the Home
Rule Amendment to the Ohio Constitution, because they enforce traffic violations
civilly while the Ohio Revised Code treats the violations as crimes.
Part II of this paper describes the history and development of traffic cameras. It
includes a discussion of how the two systems used by Cleveland (red-light and
speeding cameras) operate. It also gives a general background of the relationship
between cities and camera vendors. Part III provides the legal background of traffic
cameras. It begins by examining the various arguments that have been leveled
against cameras and then examines the litigation to date challenging traffic cameras.
Next, this Note discusses the scholarly literature on the subject and explains how this
argument situates itself in the debate. Part IV gives traffic law background by
examining the Ohio Revised Code’s traffic law and the City of Cleveland’s traffic
8

Id. at 3.

9

Id.

10
Mike Tobin, Controversy Flashes over Red-light Cameras: Q&A on Campbell’s Plan
for Cleveland, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland), Feb. 4, 2005, at A1.
11

Id.

12

Id. Conwell stated that “[i]t sounds like they have a quota to meet for the budget.” Id.

13

Id.

14

OHIO CONST. art. XVIII, § 3.

15

Id.

16

See discussion infra Part V.B1.

17

See discussion infra Part IV.A.

18

See discussion infra Part IV.B.

19

See discussion infra Part V.
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camera ordinance. It then discusses the Ohio Legislature’s involvement with traffic
cameras and explains the recent passage and veto of House Bill 56. Next, this Note
explains the current situation in the Ohio courts and the recent certification of the
constitutionality of traffic cameras to the Ohio Supreme Court. Part V discusses
Ohio’s Home Rule law. It examines the key cases decided by the Ohio Supreme
Court and explains the test for conflict between a municipal ordinance and state law.
It then advances the argument that Cleveland’s traffic cameras violate the Ohio
Constitution. Finally, Part VI concludes and calls for the Ohio Supreme Court to
find traffic cameras in conflict with the Ohio Revised Code.
II. HISTORY OF CAMERAS AND HOW THEY WORK
A. Red-light Cameras
One type of traffic camera used by the City of Cleveland is commonly referred to
as a red-light camera. While red-light cameras are relatively new to the United
States, other countries have used them for more than thirty-five years and they
currently operate in more than forty-five countries.20 Red-light cameras first
appeared in the United States in New York City in 1993.21 The cameras immediately
generated a great deal of citations.22 Amazingly, New York City has issued 1.4
million citations with only 7,000 of these citations resulting in a finding of not
guilty.23 Today, the cameras are used in more than one hundred cities and do not
appear to be going away soon, given their tremendous revenue potential.24
Red-light cameras require the integration of three separate mechanisms: a
camera, a trigger, and a computer. At a typical red-light camera intersection, the
cameras are mounted a few yards above the ground at each corner of the intersection.
The triggers are buried below the asphalt and utilize induction loop technology. One
trigger is located at the stop bar, while the other trigger is typically located in the
middle of the intersection. The induction loop triggers create a magnetic field that
determines when a vehicle has entered the intersection. The computer is wired to
both the triggers and the cameras. When the traffic light is green or yellow, the
computer ignores cars passing over the triggers. Once the light turns red, the system
photographs vehicles passing through the triggers at a given speed. Vehicles must
reach a pre-programmed speed so that the cameras do not photograph cars that are

20
THE NATIONAL CAMPAIGN TO STOP RED LIGHT RUNNING, A GUIDE TO RED LIGHT
CAMERA PROGRAMS:
STOP
ON
RED =
SAFE ON GREEN 9
(2002),
http://www.stopredlightrunning.com/pdfs/StopOnRedSafeOnGreen.pdf [hereinafter NATIONAL
CAMPAIGN].
21

Id.

22

Id. (explaining that New York City issued 168,479 tickets from just fifteen cameras in
the year following their introduction).
23

Id.

24

Laura Parker, Some Seeing Red over Red-Light Tickets, U.S.A. TODAY, Oct. 18, 2006, at

3A.
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slowly inching through the intersection in order to make a valid right turn on the red
light.25
Once the system is activated, the camera takes two pictures.26 The first picture
shows the vehicle before it enters the intersection and includes the stop bar or
crosswalk.27 The second picture shows the vehicle in the intersection while the light
is red.28 Most jurisdictions simply require that the cameras photograph the rear of
the vehicle and must include the license plate. Other jurisdictions require that a third
picture be taken showing the face of the driver. The cameras record the date of the
incident, time of the infraction and speed of the vehicle. Next, the photographs are
reviewed by police officers and tickets are mailed out to the vehicle’s registered
owner.29
B. Speed Cameras
The second type of camera enforcement technology used by the City of
Cleveland is photo speed enforcement systems or speed cameras.30 The first reported
use of this technology was in Germany in May 1973 on the Autobahn.31 By 2005,
speed enforcement systems were being used in at least seventy-five countries.32
Although their use in America is relatively limited compared to other countries, the
cameras are currently employed by a number of communities in several states and in
Washington D.C.33 However, the use of speed cameras in the United States is
rapidly increasing due to their ability to raise large amounts of revenue for
communities.34
Automated speed enforcement systems require the interaction of three elements:
a Vehicle Speed Subsystem, a Vehicle/Driver Photo Subsystem, and a Speeding
Violation Subsystem. Two common varieties of Vehicle Speed Subsystems are in
use. One type of system uses a Lidar sensor, relying on radar technology. The
system emits energy to create an electromagnetic field that is able to sense a vehicle's

25
See Tom Harris, How Red-Light Cameras Work, http://auto.howstuffworks.com/redlight-camera.htm (last visited Dec. 2, 2006).
26

NATIONAL CAMPAIGN, supra note 20, at 11.

27

Id.

28

Id. at 12.

29

Id.

30

See generally ARIZONA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, FINAL REPORT 596,
TECHNICAL EVALUATION OF PHOTO SPEED ENFORCEMENT FOR FREEWAYS 11 (2005), available
at http://www.thenewspaper.com/rlc/docs/05-scottsdale.pdf [hereinafter ADOT REPORT].
31

Id. (stating that speed cameras were installed between Cologne and Frankfurt on
Autobahn A3).
32
Id. (including Australia, Austria, Canada, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands,
Norway, South Africa, Spain, Switzerland, and Taiwan).
33

Id. (including Arizona, California, Colorado, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, and the
District of Columbia).
34

Id.
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speed.35 Other vendors utilize Piezo sensors, which are buried under the pavement
and require a vehicle to pass over them in order to determine the vehicle's speed.36
Two sensors are located a short distance apart and a vehicle's speed is calculated
based on the time it takes to travel between them.37
Once a sensor determines the vehicle’s speed, the system must then compare this
speed to the threshold speed set by the camera operator.38 The threshold speed is the
speed at which a violation occurs and is determined by the municipality using the
camera.39 For instance, if the speed limit is thirty-five miles per hour, a municipality
might set the threshold speed at forty or forty-five miles per hour.40 Once the
threshold speed is met, the vehicle is determined to be speeding, and the
Vehicle/Driver Photo Subsystem is activated and a photograph is taken.41
While early systems used film cameras, today, photo enforcement technology
utilizes digital cameras to record a speeding infraction.42 Typically, a photograph is
only taken if a vehicle is determined to be speeding.43 Like red-light cameras, the
photograph records important information such as the date of the incident and the
speed of the vehicle.44 In order to protect against privacy and tampering concerns,
most vendors encrypt the data once it has been recorded.45 The laws of the
municipality or state in which the system is located dictate the number of
photographs taken. While some areas require that only the license plate of the
vehicle is taken, others require both a picture of the license plate and of the driver of
the vehicle.46 In order to obtain the best images, the cameras require illumination.47
These flash systems must provide sufficient illumination to ensure that a clear
photograph is produced in rainy weather or at night.48 Since the flash must be

35

Id.

36

Id. at 12-13.

37

Id. at 13.

38

Id. at 14.

39

Id.

40

See generally id.

41

Id.

42

Id.

43

Id.

44

Id.

45

Id.

46

See supra note 29 and accompanying text.

47

ADOT REPORT, supra note 30, at 15 (stating that the illumination is typically provided
by “a flash tube and optimized lamp reflector”).
48

Id. (explaining that the flash system must be able to provide sufficient illumination in
any light or weather condition).

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol55/iss4/10

6

2007]

SPEEDING TOWARDS DISASTER

613

sufficiently bright and located close to the vehicle or driver, many citizens are
concerned that they may result in a temporary loss of control over the vehicle.49
The final component, the Speeding Violation Subsystem, is the administrative
component and varies widely depending on the jurisdiction that the speed camera is
located in.50 It is also the system that is subject to the greatest amount of criticism, as
discussed later in this Note.51 Very generally, it requires a reviewing officer to
identify the driver or vehicle owner and issue a citation, and affords defendants some
judicial or administrative review.52
C. Relationship between Municipalities and Camera Vendors
Perhaps the biggest problem with traffic cameras is the relationship between the
cities and the companies that install and maintain the cameras and issue the
citations.53 While camera proponents often tout the safety benefits of cameras,54 the
evidence strongly suggests that many municipalities use them to generate revenue.55
One commentator noted that a North Carolina red-light statute “sought to generate
revenue rather than to promote public safety because the standard for issuing a ticket
has been effectively lowered, making it easier to collect money.”56 In fact, studies
show that red-light cameras may actually increase accidents.57 Municipalities are
publicly promoting the supposed safety benefits of cameras, while obscuring their
real goal of revenue generation.
Contracts between camera vendors and municipalities are usually fee based,
paying vendors per ticket issued. In Toledo, the vendor Redflex keeps 75% of the
money generated by the tickets.58 The per-ticket fee arrangement benefits both the
municipality and the vendor. According to the city manager of Berkeley, California,
the city would not be able to afford the red-light cameras if it were required to lease

49

Id. (“Many citizens are concerned about frontal flash and may claim that it is unsafe to
expose a driver to such a bright light.”).
50

See generally id. at 16.

51

See discussion infra Part III.A.

52

ADOT REPORT, supra note 30, at 16 (stating that the vehicle's owner is identified
through the state's license plate records and issued a citation).
53
See, e.g., Jim Provance, Taft to Consider Red-light Camera Bill: New Law would Place
Restrictions on the Traffic Enforcement Devices, TOLEDO BLADE, Dec. 13, 2006.
54

See, e.g., Wilber & Willis, supra note 3, at A1 (stating that Washington D.C. officials
credit red-light cameras for making roads safer).
55

Editorial, When Revenue Trumps Safety in D.C., WASH. TIMES, Jan. 15, 2005, at A12
(explaining that Washington D.C. Mayor Tony Williams sought renewal of the city’s red-light
contract to maintain the collection of revenue, and made no mention of increasing road safety).
56

Andrew W.J. Tarr, Recent Development, Picture It: Red Light Cameras Abide by the
Law of the Land, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1879, 1886 (2002).
57

Wilber & Willis, supra note 3, at A1.

58

Provance, supra note 53, at A1.
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or buy the cameras and operate them.59 In St. Louis, the city receives two-thirds of
each ticket issued and “can easily generate tens of thousands of dollars a year, all
without having to put up any money.”60 Given the large amount of money to be
gained, it is not surprising that competition for these contracts is fierce among redlight camera vendors.61 This competition has the potential to corrupt government
officials as evidenced by the forced resignation of the mayor of St. Peters, Missouri,
who attempted to solicit a bribe from a camera vendor in exchange for the city’s
business.62 The potential for corruption in the current process raises valid concerns.
The City of Cleveland enacted its red-light camera ordinance on June 22, 2005.63
The ordinance required that “[t]he program [] include a fair and sound ticketevaluation by the vendor and a police officer.”64 However, an article published
shortly after the program went into effect found that in a two-week period, police
officers had reviewed only 230 of the 700 photographs taken by the city’s red-light
cameras.65 Common sense dictates that a fee based contract between city and vendor
would tend to encourage the vendor to issue as many tickets as possible without
ensuring due process and equal rights protections.66 While this proposition seems
logical, as demonstrated below, the courts have not always agreed.67 While these
types of relationships appear suspicious on their face, in order to have Cleveland’s
cameras invalidated, it is necessary to demonstrate, as this Note does, that the
cameras violate the Ohio Constitution.
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND OF TRAFFIC CAMERAS
A. Arguments against Cameras and Litigation Summary
Red-light camera critics have asserted a variety of constitutional problems with
automated enforcement programs.68 Some critics contend that the cameras violate
equal protection because punishments differ between automated enforcement
59

See Matthew Artz, Camera Company Gets Cut From Red Light Fees, BERKELEY DAILY
PLANET, Apr. 22, 2005.
60
Jake Wagman, Lights, Camera, Traffic Ticket, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Nov. 25, 2006,
at A1.
61

See id. (explaining how camera vendors employ lobbyists and former government
officials in order to win contracts).
62

Id.

63

Cleveland, Ohio, Ordinance 1183-05 (June 22, 2005).

64

Id.

65

See thenewspaper.com, Cleveland, Ohio Police Do Not Review Camera Tickets,
http://www.thenewspaper.com/news/08/818.asp (last visited Oct. 23, 2006) (stating that “more
than one-half of the notices went out without any police review.”).
66

Id.

67

See infra Part III.A.

68

See, e.g., SHARI T. KENDALL, INSURANCE INSTITUTE FOR HIGHWAY SAFETY, IS
AUTOMATED ENFORCEMENT CONSTITUTIONAL 1 (2004), http://www.iihs.org/laws/state_laws/
pdf/auto_enforce_paper.pdf.
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violations and violations enforced by “on-the-spot” police officers.69 Others assert
that municipal programs that boot vehicles when the owners fail to pay automated
enforcement tickets constitute a taking under the Fifth Amendment.70 Critics who
consider the violations an illegal search and seizure implicate the Fourth
Amendment.71 Still others contend that automated enforcement programs are an
unjustified invasion of privacy.72 However, the problems with this argument have
been examined73 and one judge explained “[a]lthough cameras operated by the
Government are a concern regarding privacy issues, those concerns are outweighed
by the legitimate concerns of safety on our public streets.”74
Other arguments against cameras raise due process concerns by examining the
hearing process. Since the vehicle’s owner is presumed guilty, challenging the ticket
is extremely difficult.75 In Chicago, ninety percent of challenges fail because the city
will accept only a handful of defenses.76 In explaining the difference between a
camera violation and a ticket by a police officer, a commentator explained that “[a]
camera-monitored violation may be proved by a mere preponderance of the
evidence, but the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a[] [police officer
cited] infraction was committed.”77 The evidence demonstrates that red-light tickets
are extremely difficult to challenge and therefore critics contend that they violate due
process because they do not ensure a fair and impartial hearing.78 Another argument
against the use of red-light cameras is that the statutes authorizing them place the
burden of proof on the defendant.79 For example, Cleveland’s ordinance states that

69

Id. (noting that the County Court of Denver, Colorado has found the different
punishments reasonable).
70

Id. at 2.

71

Id. (explaining that a court upheld the practice of booting because it did not constitute a
taking of the vehicle).
72

Id. at 2-3 (noting that the issue has never been raised in court because the Supreme
Court has noted limited privacy in automobiles).
73

See Mary Lehman, Comment, Are Red Light Cameras Snapping Privacy Rights?, 33 U.
TOL. L. REV. 815 (2002). A person has a “lesser expectation of privacy in an automobile.” Id.
at 818. Also, if an automobile is considered to be in plain view, it will fall under the plain
view exception for warrantless searches. Id. at 820. Since automobiles rarely serve as an
individual’s residence, they are subject to a lesser degree of privacy protection. Id. at 828.
Although the Supreme Court has not directly ruled on this issue, red light cameras seem to fall
outside of the Fourth Amendment’s reach. Id. at 828-29.
74
See Agomo v. Williams, No. 02-0006520, 2003 D.C. Super. LEXIS 31, 17 (D.C. Super.
2003).
75

Monifa Thomas, Just Shut Up and Pay, CHI. SUN TIMES, Oct. 30, 2006, at 3.

76
Id. (stating that the registered owner must prove that the vehicle was leased to another
person or stolen in order to win a challenge).
77

Tarr, supra note 56, at 1886.

78

Id.

79

See Riley v. City of Cleveland, No. 1:06CV619, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36127, 3-4
(N.D. Ohio June 2, 2006).
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“[t]he contents of the ticket shall constitute prima facie evidence of the facts it
contains.”80 Plaintiffs around the country have alleged that red-light camera
programs are unconstitutional because vehicle owners are ticketed whether or not it
can be proved that they are driving.81
In recent years there has been a wide expansion of traffic camera litigation.82 Of
the existing cases, very few have examined the constitutionality of cameras as this
Note does. For example, one case challenged the District of Columbia statute on the
grounds that the “provision on its face presumes that the owner of a vehicle was its
driver at the time of the infraction.”83 The plaintiff alleged that he did not know who
was driving his car at the time of the violation, and that because the driver could not
be identified, the District of Columbia “impermissibly shifted the burden of proving
the violation to him.”84 However, the court upheld the statute and granted the
District’s motion for summary judgment.85
The federal courts have skirted the question for the most part and avoided
deciding the constitutionality of the cameras.86 In Dajani v. Maryland, the district
court dismissed the case for lack of federal jurisdiction, and did not reach the merits
of the plaintiff’s constitutional claims.87 An Oregon appellate court also dismissed a
case in which the plaintiff alleged a violation of his constitutional right to due
process.88 In affirming the dismissal, the Ninth Circuit stated that “the district court
properly concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to declare the defendant’s speeding
conviction unconstitutional, grant him a new hearing, or compel the State of Oregon
to refund his fine.”89 However, a North Carolina District Court did reach some of the
constitutional issues of red-light cameras but held that the appellant lacked standing
to challenge the statute.90 In addition, a lawsuit is currently pending in an Ohio
federal court alleging “constitutional violations with respect to the burden of proof,

80

Cleveland, Ohio, Ordinance 1183-05 (June 22, 2005).

81

Parker, supra note 24, at 3A.

82

See Parker, supra note 24, at 3A.

83

Agomo v. Williams, No. 02-0006520, 2003 D.C. Super. LEXIS 31, 17 (D.C. Super. June
12, 2003).
84

Id. at 17-18.

85

Id. at 23.

86

See generally Dajani v. Maryland, No. Civ.CCB-00-713, 2001 WL 85181 (D. Md. Jan.
24, 2001).
87

Id.

88

Holst v. City of Portland, No. CV-03-1330-ST, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9076, 19 (D. Or.
May 14, 2004) (“Holst has identified no practice by the City of Portland regarding the
procedures employed for processing photo radar speed violations that falls below
constitutional due process minimums.”).
89

Holst v. City of Portland, 152 Fed. App'x 588, 589 (9th Cir. 2005).

90

See Shavitz v. City of High Point, 270 F. Supp. 2d 702 (M.D.N.C. 2003).
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the presentation of evidence, . . . and the Excessive Fine Clause of the Eighth
Amendment.”91
Litigants challenging red-light cameras have had more success in state courts.
Recently, a Minnesota appellate court held that the state’s photo-enforcement
ordinance was “in conflict” with the Minnesota Highway Traffic Regulation Act.92
While emphasizing that its decision “does not determine the general validity or
invalidity of photo-enforcement of traffic violations,”93 the court interestingly noted
a trend in legal challenges to red-light cameras.94 It stated that “the automatedtraffic-enforcement systems that have been upheld against legal challenges by
vehicle owners are cases in which the state, rather than a local unit of government,
enacted the vehicle-owner-liability legislation.”95 The question was appealed to the
Minnesota Supreme Court, which affirmed the appellate court on April 5, 2007.96
Other courts have dismissed convictions by determining that the evidence was
insufficient to sustain a conviction.97 The Oregon Supreme Court dismissed a redlight camera conviction because there was no witness available to identify the driver
of the car and no evidence that the defendant owned the car.98 In addition, an Oregon
appellate court recently held that the state’s speedy trial statute applied to camera
citations, because the state law mandated that traffic violations were crimes and thus
subject to the rules of criminal procedure.99 Since courts are reluctant to discuss the
federal constitutionality of cameras, a challenge to Cleveland’s system will likely
have to rely on state law as the preceding successful challenges have.
B. Scholarly Literature Overview
The scholarly literature to date has found traffic cameras to be constitutional. A
law review article written by Mary Lehman focuses on the question of whether redlight cameras constitute an invasion of privacy or a valid restriction on liberty
because running red lights is illegal and dangerous.100 Lehman argues that cameras
only record information that is in plain view and that there is no expectation of
privacy on a public street, and therefore, the cameras do not constitute an invasion of

91
Riley v. City of Cleveland, No. 1:06 CV 619, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36127, 3-4 (N.D.
Ohio June 2, 2006).
92

Minnesota v. Kuhlman, 722 N.W.2d 1, 8 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006).

93

Id.

94

Id.

95

Id.

96

See State v. Kuhlman, 729 N.W.2d 577, 584 (Minn. 2007) (holding that the Minneapolis
local ordinance conflicted with the state’s traffic laws).
97

See State v. Clay, 332 P.3d 1101, 1104 (Or. 2001).

98

Id.

99

State v. Greenlick, A127374, 2007 Ore. App. LEXIS 212, 10 (Or. Ct. App. Feb. 7, 2007)
(dismissing appellant’s camera citation because the state violated his right to a speedy trial).
Id. at 10-11.
100

Lehman, supra note 73, at 815.
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privacy.101 She contends that when offenders run a red light, they forego their right
to privacy.102 Lehman discusses proposed alternatives to red-light cameras but
refutes them and argues that the cameras are at least comparable but in most cases
better solutions.103 She believes that opponents are too quick to condemn cameras by
overlooking benefits because they are focused on their fear of too much government
control.104
An article by Steven Naumchik makes an argument in support of cameras based
on safety.105 Naumchik says that “positive statistical results are undisputed” with
respect to the efficiency of red-light cameras in ensuring safety.106 The article’s
focus is on camera enforcement legislation in California, specifically a “three year
demonstration program” enacted between 1995 and 1998.107 He also argues that
California’s cameras do not violate “autonomy privacy” or “informational privacy,”
which are components of the California state constitution.108 The author adds that a
constitutional issue could arise if private information were improperly
disseminated.109 He concludes the argument by insisting that the government has a
valid interest in ensuring public welfare through enforcement of red lights and
camera legislation will save more lives than it harms.110
Since this debate is a relatively new one, the scholarly literature is somewhat
limited. All the law review articles written on the subject have argued that traffic
cameras are constitutional. No article has discussed the validity of Cleveland’s
traffic cameras or of the home rule argument advanced by this Note. The published
literature tends to stress the safety benefits of traffic cameras.111 While the literature
argues that cameras are important for ensuring safety, studies have shown that this is
not always the case.112 Mainly, the debate has centered on the expectation of privacy
under the U.S. Constitution.113 The articles have argued that the use of traffic

101

Id.

102

Id. at 831.

103

Id. at 845.

104

Id.

105

Steven Tafoya Naumchik, Review of Selected 1998 California Legislation:
Transportation and Motor Vehicles: Stop! Photographic Enforcement of Red Lights, 30
MCGEORGE L. REV. 833, 834 (1999).
106

Id. at 851.

107

Id. at 833-34. The statute was enacted on a temporary basis as an experiment,
reevaluated three years later, and ultimately put in place permanently. Id. at 838. No
constitutional or policy flaws were determined during the reevaluation process. Id.
108

Id. at 841.

109

Id.

110

Id.

111

See supra notes 100-110 and accompanying text.

112

See, e.g.. supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text.

113

See supra notes 100-110 and accompanying text.
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cameras does not violate these constitutional provisions.114 The way that camera
operators circumvent these constitutional issues is by enforcing the violations as civil
instead of criminal penalties.115 However, this Note argues that the transformation of
a criminal penalty at the state level to a civil penalty at the municipal level violates
Article XVIII of the Ohio Constitution.116
IV. TRAFFIC LAW BACKGROUND AND CURRENT SITUATION IN OHIO
A. Traffic Offenses under the Ohio Revised Code
In order to show how Cleveland’s photo enforcement ordinance violates the
Home Rule Amendment to the Ohio Constitution, a logical starting point is the Ohio
Revised Code’s treatment of traffic offenses. Section 4511.21 of the Ohio Revised
Code (“O.R.C.”) defines speeding offenses under Ohio law.117 Ohio Revised Code
§ 4511.21(A) provides, “[n]o person shall operate a motor vehicle . . . at a speed
greater or less than is reasonable or proper . . . and . . . at a greater speed than will
permit the person to bring it to a stop within the assured clear distance ahead.”118
The section then goes on to list the different speed limits allowed on various types of
thoroughfares, and makes it prima facie lawful “in the absence of a lower limit
declared pursuant to this section by . . . local authorities” to travel at the enumerated
speeds.119 The importance of this language is that although municipalities may under
certain enumerated circumstances require vehicles to travel more slowly than
mandated by statute, they may not allow vehicles in their localities to travel at speeds
greater than the statute. This suggests that the Ohio Legislature sought to enact a
general ceiling on speed limits in the State. Although they recognized that certain
local conditions might require a slower speed of travel, they did not delegate to
municipalities the police power to exceed these limits. This leads to the inference
that the Legislature wanted to ensure that its citizens remained safe when traveling
on the State’s roads and did not trust municipalities with this important obligation.120
The Ohio Supreme Court previously held as much with respect to Title 45 of the
Ohio Revised Code.121

114

See supra notes 100-110 and accompanying text.

115

See generally CLEVELAND, OHIO, TRAFFIC CODE 413.031 (2005) (stating that camera
violations will be enforced civilly).
116

See discussion infra Part V.

117

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4511.21 (LEXISNEXIS 2006).

118

Id.

119

Id. § 4511.21(B) (emphasis added). For instance, the statute sets a speed limit of twenty
miles per hour in a school zone, twenty-five miles per hour in other portions of municipalities,
thirty-five miles per hour on state routes, and sixty-five miles per hour on freeways.
120

Id.

121

City of Cleveland Heights v. Woodle, 198 N.E2d 68, 70 (Ohio 1964) (stating that
section 4511.21 was enacted in order to provide uniform traffic rules throughout the state).
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Ohio Revised Code § 4511.21(E) and (F) describe the procedures to be followed
by police officers when charging a person with a violation of that section.122 These
sections are meant to ensure proper service and notice.123 Notable in the language of
the statute is the mention labeling of the alleged violator as the “defendant,”
suggesting that these are criminal violations.124 Section 4511.21(G) requires that
points be assessed for a violation of the statute according to the procedure outlined in
section 4510.036.125 This requirement is aimed at keeping the roads safe by
suspending the license of motorists who exhibit extremely reckless and unsafe
driving habits.126
Finally, O.R.C. § 4511.21(P) sets forth the criminal penalties for violations of the
state’s traffic laws.127 A motorist’s first violation of the section results in a minor
misdemeanor. However, with each additional offense within a one-year period, the
gravity of the crime increases. Two violations result within a year result in a
misdemeanor of the fourth degree, and so on.128 These statutes make clear the
Legislature’s specific intention to treat speeding violations as criminal acts.
Nowhere do the State’s extensive traffic statutes treat these violations as civil
offense, and there is no delegation to municipalities of the power to decriminalize
speeding offenses.
B. Traffic Violations under Cleveland’s Ordinance
To illustrate just how great the conflict is between Cleveland’s traffic cameras
and the Ohio Revised Code, it is useful to examine the Cleveland ordinance that
allows photo enforcement. The City of Cleveland’s traffic code permits civil
enforcement of red-light and speeding violations.129 The city amended its traffic
code on July 20, 2005 to allow for a “civil enforcement system for red-light and
speeding offenders photographed by means of an ‘automated traffic enforcement
camera system.’”130 Chapters 413.031(b) and 413.031(c) explain that the owner of
the vehicle shall be liable for the penalty resulting from a red-light or speeding

122

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4511.21(E) (LEXISNEXIS 2006) (“In every charge of violation
of this section the affidavit and warrant shall specify the time, place, and speed at which the
defendant is alleged to have driven.”). See also id. § 4511.21(F) (stating that when a speed in
excess of the limit is charged, the “defendant” must be charged in a “single affidavit, alleging
a single act” with a violation of the law.
123

Id. § 4511.21(E)-(F).

124

Id. § 4511.21(E).

125

Id. § 4511.21(G).

126

See generally OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4510.036 (LEXISNEXIS 2006) (explaining the
points system and when a driver’s license will be suspended). See also infra notes 265-67 and
accompanying text.
127

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4511.21(P) (LEXISNEXIS 2006).

128

Id.

129

CLEVELAND, OHIO, TRAFFIC CODE 413.031 (2005) (“Use of Automated Cameras to
Impose Civil Penalties upon Red Light and Speeding Violators.”).
130

Id. 413.031(a) (imposing monetary liability on red light running and speeding).
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offense, respectively.131 Chapter 413.031(d) of the traffic code then states that “[t]he
imposition of liability under this section shall not be deemed a conviction for any
purpose and shall not be made part of the operating record of any person on whom
the liability is imposed.”132
Chapter 413.031(i) explains that a violation of the ordinance is a “noncriminal
violation for which a civil penalty shall be assessed and for which no points . . . shall
be assigned.”133 Finally, the ordinance states that it is prima facie evidence that the
registered owner of the vehicle was the driver at the time of the incident.”134 The
face of the ordinance represents a direct contrast with the traffic statutes of the Ohio
Revised Code.135 The ordinance does nothing to ensure that unsafe drivers will be
kept off the road.136 It has no procedural safeguards ensuring legitimate notice and
service, and it places the burden on the vehicle’s owner to prove he did not commit
the violation.137 The ordinance represents a complete departure from the treatment
the Ohio Legislature decided to give traffic offenses in the Ohio Revised Code.138
C. Ohio House Bill 241
The Ohio Revised Code is silent on the issue of whether municipalities may use
red-light or speed cameras to enforce municipal traffic laws.139 The Ohio Legislature
has attempted to address the issue twice, once by attempting to pass legislation
allowing municipalities to use these cameras,140 and more recently, by passing
legislation, later vetoed, which would have severely restricted their effectiveness.141
House Bill 241 was proposed by Representative Robert Latta and sought to amend
certain sections of the Ohio Revised Code to establish a “non-criminal enforcement
131

Id. 413.031(b)-(c).

132

Id. 413.031(d).

133

Id. 413.031(i).

134

Id. 413.031(l).

135
Compare CLEVELAND, OHIO, TRAFFIC CODE 413.031 (2005), with OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 4511.21 (LEXISNEXIS 2006).
136

See supra note 132 and accompanying text.

137

See supra notes 133 and accompanying text.

138

See supra notes 117-28 and accompanying text.

139

See generally, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. (LexisNexis 2006) (Red light or speed cameras
are not mentioned at all in the entire Ohio Revised Code).
140

See H.R. 241, 124th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2001) (introduced on May 2, 2001,
this law was never passed by the Ohio General Assembly).
141
H.B. 56, 126th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2005). This bill passed the Ohio House
on December 12, 2006. See Joseph L. Wagner, New Law Puts City’s Traffic Cameras in
Jeopardy, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland), Dec. 13, 2006, at A1. However, just before leaving
office, former Ohio Governor Bob Taft vetoed the legislation saying that it “unjustifiably
eliminates the discretion of our locally elected and locally accountable officials in favor of a
one-size-fits-all method with essentially unenforceable penalties. See Reginald Fields, Taft
Vetoes Bill to Stop Traffic Cameras; Cities Call it Victory for Home Rule, PLAIN DEALER
(Cleveland), Jan. 6, 2007, at B1.
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mechanism” that would allow municipalities, counties, or townships to install redlight cameras and issue tickets to drivers that ran red lights.142
Under the bill, use of cameras would have been limited to counties with
populations over 400,000. The proposed bill sought to decriminalize red-light
violations that were captured by the cameras, making them civil offenses. It also
would have allowed municipalities to set up traffic control signal violations bureaus
that would hear appeals of tickets issued by the cameras. The bill would have
prohibited municipalities from entering into fee-based contracts with vendors that
were contingent on the number of citations issued.143 However, the proposed bill
never passed the Ohio House and did not become law.144
D. Ohio House Bill 56
Five years later, both chambers of the Ohio General Assembly did pass a bill that
would have significantly curtailed the use of red-light and speed cameras in the state,
only to have it vetoed by the outgoing governor.145 House Bill 56 sought to amend
the Ohio Revised Code by creating sections 4511.092, 4511.093, and 4511.094.146
Section 4511.092 would have prohibited municipalities wishing to use camera
enforcement from entering into fee-based contracts that were contingent “upon the
number of tickets issued or the amount of fines levied or collected by the local
authority.”147 This would have insured that tickets were only issued for valid
violations, because private companies would no longer enjoy monetary incentives to
issue as many tickets as possible.148 Representative Jim Raussen, the Bill’s chief
proponent, stated “why not put in tougher restrictions . . . [i]t’s too easy to issue
tickets.”149

142

H.R. 241, 124th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2001).

143

Id.

144

Although no source exists explicitly stating that the bill never passed, the author is
inferring this from the fact that the Ohio Revised Code was never amended to authorize red
light cameras. The author also does not know the reasons why the bill did not pass, but he can
speculate on a couple of possible reasons. The easiest explanation is that the Legislature
simply did not want to give municipalities the authority to use red light cameras. Another
plausible explanation is that camera vendors were extremely upset with the bill’s prohibition
on contingency-based contracts. Knowing that the bill would cost them a great deal of
potential profits, it is possible that red light vendors successfully lobbied to have the bill killed
in the house.
145

See James Cummings, Veto keeps the red-light cameras rolling: Gov. Taft Says Cities
should be able to Enforce Traffic Laws as they see fit, DAYTON DAILY NEWS, Jan. 6, 2007 at
A4.
146

H.B. 56, 126th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2005).

147

Id.

148

See generally id.; see also Matthew Artz, Camera Company Gets Cut From Red Light
Fees, BERKELEY DAILY PLANET, Apr. 22, 2005 (explaining that contingency fee contracts
might give vendors an incentive to maximize the number of citations issued).
149

Provance, supra note 53 at A1.
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The House Bill would still have allowed red-light violations, however it would
have severely limited the ability of municipalities to issue speed violations.150 In
order to do so, a police officer would have to witness the violation and write the
ticket.151 It also protected against privacy concerns by forbidding the cameras from
taking pictures of the automobile’s driver.152 In an effort to protect the due process
rights of citizens, the law placed the burden of proving a violation on the state, a big
change from the current system in which the burden is placed on the vehicle’s owner
to prove that he or she did not commit the offense.153 The law required review of the
photographs by a law enforcement officer and forbade municipalities from issuing
tickets “in the name of a motor vehicle leasing dealer or motor vehicle renting
dealer.”154 This was meant to insure that only the actual driver of the vehicle and not
simply the registered owner of the vehicle would be cited.155
The bill also addressed the conflict between the Ohio Revised Code’s criminal
treatment of moving violations, and their civil treatment in traffic camera
ordinances.156 The new law would have permitted municipalities to enforce camera
violations as civil violations, and thus there would be no conflict between the state
and local laws.157
Section 4511.093 sought to establish “standards governing the use of traffic law
photo-monitoring devices” in order to govern where the cameras could be installed
and the necessary warning signs that would be erected.158 Finally, the proposed law
150

H.B. 56, 126th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2005). Section (B)(2) of the proposed
code stated that a local authority “[s]hall use the devices for the enforcement of a qualified
traffic violation and not for the purpose of enforcing other traffic laws, unless a law
enforcement officer is present at the location of the device and issues the ticket at the time and
location of the violation.”
151

Id.

152

Id. Section (B)(9) prohibited the “use of any such device to photograph, videotape, or
produce a digital image of a vehicle operator for the purpose of determining whether a
qualified traffic violation has occurred.” Id.
153

Id. Section (F)(1) required that “[t]he local authority shall have the burden of proving a
contested violation by a preponderance of evidence.” Id.
154

Id.

155

Id.

156

See Daniel Moadus, Jr., et al. v. City of Girard, No. 05-CV-1927, 6 (Ct. Com. Pl.
Trumbull County July 6, 2006) (“[T]he Ordinance purports to simply override R.C. Sections
4510.036 and 4511.21(G) with respect to the point system. There is a public policy the State
Legislature has implemented through the point system to take careless or reckless drivers off
the roads.”; see also OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4510.036 (LexisNexis 2006) (stating that a court
shall assess points to an offender’s driving record). A speeding offense requires four points if
the speed is more than thirty miles over the speed limit and two points for any other speeding
offense. Id.
157

H.B. 56, 126th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2005) (stating in section 4511.092 that
these violations would not be considered a criminal offense and forbidding the assessment of
points against an offender’s driving record).
158

Id. (stating that the standards should be set by the department of transportation and
requiring consultation with the local governments).
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established a “legislative traffic law photo-enforcement study committee” to consist
of three members of the Ohio Senate and three members of the Ohio House.159 The
committee was charged with evaluating the use of photo-enforcement in Ohio and
was to make recommendations as to the continued use of the technology in the
state.160
A year and a half after its introduction, the final version of the bill passed the
Senate by a vote of eighteen to thirteen on December 12, 2006.161 In passing the bill,
Senator Jeff Armbruster, the bill’s key advocate in the Senate called the cameras a
“monstrous speed trap” and that their chief purpose was to raise revenue, not to
improve safety.162 The bill passed the House on December 12, 2006 by a vote of
sixty-six to twenty-eight and was sent to the Governor for his review.163 Cities
around the State of Ohio immediately began lobbying the Governor to veto the
bill.164 Cleveland Mayor Frank Jackson stated that the bill demonstrated the Ohio
Legislature’s “anti-urban agenda” and that it “discriminates against Cleveland,
interferes with our right to enter into contracts and our right to self-governance.”165
Conspicuously absent from the pleas of officials in several cities around the state,
was any mention of the safety that the cameras bring to the communities.166
On January 5, 2007, his last day in office, Governor Taft vetoed the bill.167 He
argued that the bill “unjustifiably eliminates the discretion of our locally elected and
locally accountable officials in favor of a one-size-fits-all method with essentially
unenforceable penalties.”168 Although the Ohio Constitution allows a governor’s

159

Id.

160

Id. The committee was to make a report to the leaders of both the Senate and the House
six months after the bill’s passage. Id.
161

See thenewspaper.com, Ohio Senate Votes to Ban Speed Cameras,
http://www.thenewspaper.com/news/14/1484.asp (calling the legislation an “effective ban” on
speed cameras and noting that the bill would be sent to the House to approve the final
version).
162

Wagner, supra note 141, at A1.

163

Id.

164

See, e.g. Jodi Andes, Taft Urged to put Stop to Red-light Camera Bill, COLUMBUS
DISPATCH, Dec. 13, 2006, at 1A (stating that Columbus Mayor Michael Coleman urged Taft to
veto the bill).
165

Wagner, supra note 141, at A1.

166

See Provance, supra note 53 at A1 (“Officials in Toledo, Northwood, Columbus,
Cleveland, and several other Ohio cities are hoping Gov. Bob Taft will stand up for the rights
of local government when it comes to traffic enforcement cameras . . . .”). Representative Jim
Raussen, a major proponent of the bill stated, “[I]f we really want to make sure it’s about
public safety, then let the study commission make recommendations to this body.” Id.
167

Fields, supra note 141; see also Cummings, supra note 186.

168

Cummings, supra note 145. Taft also stated, “I can discern no strong public policy that
warrants this sweeping preemption of local control over our local streets.” Jim Siegel & Mark
Niquette, Taft Saves Red-light Cameras for Cities: Governor lets Ban on lead-paint lawsuits
become Ohio Law, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Jan. 6, 2007, at 1A.
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veto to be overridden by a three-fifths vote of both houses,169 the current legislature
cannot override the veto because the bill was approved during the previous
session.170 Representative Raussen stated that he would consider reintroducing the
bill, however this is unlikely since a spokesman for incoming Governor Ted
Strickland said that Strickland supported Taft’s decision.171 Therefore, it appears
extremely unlikely that the Ohio Legislature will be able to ban the use of cameras,
and opponents of the cameras will have to use different means to accomplish their
goals.172
E. The Current Situation in The Ohio Courts
Despite Governor Taft’s veto of House Bill 56, the fate of red-light and speeding
cameras in Cleveland is still uncertain. The Ohio Supreme Court has decided one
case involving automated-camera systems; however they did not reach the
constitutional issues of interest in this Note.173 In holding that the petitioners had not
met the extraordinary requirements for a writ of prohibition, the court explained, “it
is unclear whether [Cleveland’s Municipal Ordinance] conflicts with R.C.
4521.05.”174 Another case, Mendenhall v. City of Akron, currently pending in the
United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio might force the Ohio
Supreme Court to determine whether red-light cameras are legal under the Ohio
Constitution.175 The case involves a challenge to the city of Akron’s Automated
Mobile Speed Enforcement Systems.176 The plaintiffs assert that the use of cameras
by the city violate both the Ohio Constitution and the United States Constitution.177
In a Memorandum Opinion published on May 17, 2006, Judge David Dowd, Jr.
found that Akron's ordinance authorizing civil penalties for camera violations was
169

OHIO CONST. art. II, § 16.

170

Siegel & Niquette, supra note 168.

171

Fields, supra note 141 (“Strickland spokesman Keith Dailey said the new governor
supports home rule and Taft’s decision.”).
172

See generally id.

173

See State ex rel. Scott v. City of Cleveland, 859 N.E.2d 923, 926 (Ohio 2006) (holding
that a writ of prohibition against the city’s traffic-camera programs was not warranted by the
circumstances).
174

Id. at 927.

175

See, e.g., John Higgins, Speed Cams are back in Court: Federal Judge asks Ohio
Supreme Court to Rule on Correct Use, AKRON BEACON J., Dec. 5, 2006 (“A federal judge has
asked the Ohio Supreme Court to decide whether municipalities such as Akron can use
automated cameras to issue civil fines for what Ohio law says are criminal traffic offenses).
176

Id.

177

See, Mendenhall v. City of Akron, No. 5:06CV139, No. 5:06CV154, 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 30275, 9-10 (N.D. Ohio May 17, 2006). In the stipulations of facts, the Court explains
that Mendenhall is asserting a violation of her due process rights under the Ohio and United
States Constitutions. Id. She is also asserting a claim that Akron’s ordinance allowing the use
of these cameras violates the Home Rule Amendment to the Ohio Constitution. Id. This
claim is premised on Mendenhall’s assertion that Ohio Revised Code Section 4511.07 is a
general law, and thus, the Akron ordinance conflicts with it. Id.
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valid under the Ohio Constitution.178 The court did not rule on the plaintiffs' federal
claims and allowed the parties to move forward with discovery to resolve the
issues.179
Two months after the Northern District's opinion, Judge John Straud of the
Trumbull County Court of Common Pleas found that a Girard, Ohio ordinance
allowing red-light cameras did conflict with certain state traffic statutes.180 In light
of the Trumbull County ruling, on November 30, 2006, Judge Dowd vacated the
portion of his Memorandum Opinion that concluded that Akron’s ordinance was
valid under the Ohio Constitution.181 Furthermore, the Judge certified the following
question to the Ohio Supreme Court: “Whether a municipality has the power under
home rule to enact civil penalties for the offense of violating a traffic signal light or
for the offense of speeding, both of which are criminal offenses under the Ohio
Revised Code.”182
This answer to this question is will determine if Cleveland will continue to use
photo enforcement cameras.183 As the court notes in Mendenhall, there are several
challenges currently being litigated statewide concerning the use of these cameras.184
The defendant’s preliminary memorandum on the certified question of law to the
178

Id. at 20 (“[T]he Court finds that the many pronouncements of the Ohio Supreme Court
stand for the proposition that in determining whether a municipal ordinance . . . is in ‘conflict’
with the general laws of Ohio, the test whether [is] whether the [] ordinance permits or
licenses that which the Ohio statutes forbid and prohibit and vice versa. In this case, the Court
finds that the challenged ordinance neither permits or licenses that which the laws of the Ohio
General Assembly either forbid or prohibit and vice versa.”).
179

Id. at 26-29 (stating that the court did have some concerns over possible federal due
process and equal protection issues and therefore delayed ruling on defendants' motion for a
judgment on the pleadings). The court also denied plaintiff Mendenhall's motion to remand
the case back to Common Pleas Court of Summit County. Id. at 29.
180
Daniel Moadus, Jr. v. City of Girard, No. 05-CV-1927, 5 (Ct. Com. Pl. Trumbull
County July 6, 2006) (stating that the Ohio “Legislature has authorized civil, non-criminal
penalties to be set by municipalities for parking tickets). The court noted that there had been
no action by the State Legislature that would allow the extension of this policy to speeding.
Id. at 7. The court held the challenged ordinance to violate Article XVIII, Section 3 of the
Ohio Constitution. Id.
181
Mendenhall v. City of Akron, No. 5:06CV139, No. 5:06CV154, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
86843, 9-10 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 30, 2006) (“The Court has also come to the conclusion that, in
view of the ruling by the Trumbull County Court of Common Pleas in Moadus v. City of
Girard, . . . it must VACATE that portion of the May 17, 2006 Memorandum Opinion
wherein it concluded that the City of Akron has the power under Home Rule to adopt
legislation calling for civil penalties for speeding violations detected by the automated system
. . . .”).
182

Mendenhall v. City of Akron, No. 5:06CV139, No. 5:06CV154, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
86839, 3 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 30, 2006) (The court noted that “[n]o controlling precedent of the
Ohio Supreme Court answers this question, which is potentially dispositive of the two abovecaptioned cases).
183

See Id.

184

Id. at 3 (noting that at least three similar lawsuits are currently being litigated in
different courts around Ohio).
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Ohio Supreme Court notes that many of the lawsuits challenging camera
enforcement have been stayed pending resolution of this question by the Ohio
Supreme Court.185 The question is not easy, and involves almost a century of Ohio
Supreme Court jurisprudence that has followed the enactment of Amendment XVIII
to the Ohio Constitution. This Paper urges the Ohio Supreme Court to conclude that
municipal ordinances allowing speed and red-light cameras do conflict with the
Home Rule Amendment.
V. HOME RULE ARGUMENT
A. Home Rule Under The Ohio Constitution
In its 200-year history, the state of Ohio has had only two constitutions, with the
current Constitution being ratified in 1851.186 In 1912, the people of Ohio amended
their Constitution by adding article XVIII, commonly referred to as the Home Rule
Amendment.187 The amendment came about due to the efforts of Progressives during
the 1912 constitutional convention.188 Prior to the Amendment, municipalities could
exercise only those powers that the Ohio General Assembly delegated to them.189
The intention of those who drafted the Amendment was to accomplish three goals:
1) to allow municipalities the option to have different forms of municipal
organization; 2) to give municipalities all the powers of local governance that did
not conflict with the state’s general laws; and 3) to define and expand municipal
power in the operation of local utilities.190
The second goal, considered the most difficult objective, is found in section three
of the Amendment, which outlines the powers that municipal corporations have. The
section states: “Municipalities shall have authority to exercise all powers of local
self-government and to adopt and enforce within their limits such local police,
sanitary and other similar regulations, as are not in conflict with general laws.”191 It
185

Memorandum of Defendants-Respondents The City of Akron and Nestor Traffic
Systems, Inc. in Support of the Court’s Jurisdiction to Answer the Certified Question of Law
at 7, Mendenhall v. City of Akron, No. 2006-2265 (Ohio Dec. 28, 2006) (“Indeed, several
judges have stayed proceedings until there is a decision on the certified question by this
Court.”). The brief quotes an order by Judge Timothy McMonagle of the Cuyahoga County
Court of Common Pleas in McNamara v. City of Cleveland. Id. McMonagle stated: “The
Court finds that the remaining issue in this case is identical to the question of law Certified to
the Ohio Supreme Court on December 8, 2006, Case No. 06-2265. Therefore, this case is
hereby placed on the inactive docket. The case may be reactivated only upon motion of a
party after the Ohio Supreme Court issues a ruling in Case No. 06-2265.” Id.
186
STEVEN H. STEINGLASS & GINO J. SCARSELLI, THE OHIO STATE CONSTITUTION: A
REFERENCE GUIDE 1 (2004).
187

Id. at 327.

188

Id.

189

Id.

190

GEORGE D. VAUBEL, MUNICIPAL HOME RULE IN OHIO 14-15 (1978) (stating that these
goals resulted from a compromise between those wanting the state to remain superior and
those desiring that municipalities have complete sovereignty).
191

OHIO CONST. art. XVIII, § 3.
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“defines the relationship between municipal and state power” and gives a
municipality the power to exercise its powers of self-government.192 This section is
the most litigated of the Home Rule Amendment, and in the years following its
adoption the Ohio Supreme Court has written many opinions explaining and
applying the section.193
B. How Cleveland’s Traffic Cameras Violate Home Rule
The Ohio Supreme Court in City of Canton v. State explained the three-part test
used to determine when a local ordinance is void under the Home Rule
Amendment.194 The court explained that: “[a] state statute takes precedence over a
local ordinance when (1) the ordinance is in with the statute, (2) the ordinance is an
exercise of the police power, rather than of local self-government, and (3) the statute
is a general law.”195 In Village of Struthers v. Sokol, the Supreme Court explained
the application of the first element, the “conflict” test.196 According to Sokol, an
ordinance conflicts with a statute when “the ordinance permits or licenses that which
the statute forbids and prohibits and vice versa.”197 This definition is the most widely
cited; however, the Ohio Supreme Court has offered others.198 Under the second
prong of the test, if a municipal ordinance is not an exercise of the police power, it is
valid under the delegated power of local self-government.199 In order to constitute a
192

Id.

193

OHIO CONST. art. XVIII, § 3 (West 2006). The editor’s comments to this compilation of
the Ohio Constitution states that “[t]his section is and has been productive of much litigation
to define its parameters.” Id. Much of the litigation involves determinations of what the
various terms actually mean. Id.
194

766 N.E.2d 963, 966 (Ohio 2002). Canton involved a city code that prohibited the use
of mobile homes as principal or accessory structures for residential use. Id. at 965. The city
of Canton “amended its code to include ‘manufactured homes’ within the definition of ‘mobile
homes,’” thus prohibiting manufactured homes within city limits. Id. However, the Ohio
legislature had recently enacted a law that prohibited cities from banning manufactured
homes. Id. The court held that the state law was not a general law, and struck it down for
violating the home-rule provision of the Ohio Constitution. Id. at 969.
195

Id. at 966.

196

Village of Struthers v. Sokol, 140 N.E. 519, 521 (Ohio 1923). Sokol involved a
municipal ordinance that prohibited the sale of intoxicating liquor. Id. at 520. The penalties
provided by the state law were much more severe than those established by the ordinance. Id.
at 521. Applying the test, the court held that the ordinances did not permit something that the
state law prevented and vice versa, therefore the municipal ordinances were not in conflict
with the state laws. Id. at 522.
197

Id.

198

See, e.g., City of Cleveland v. Betts, 154 N.E.2d 917, 919 (stating that the Struthers test
is not exclusive). The Court found that although the ordinance did not meet the definition
from Struthers, it did “contravene the expressed policy of the state with respect to crimes by
deliberately changing an act which constitutes a felony under state law into a misdemeanor,
and this creates the kind of conflict contemplated by the Constitution.” Id. at 919.
199

Village of Beachwood v. Bd. of Elections of Cuyahoga County, 148 N.E.2d 921, 923
(Ohio 1958) (stating that if a local regulation affects only the municipality, it is within the
municipality’s power of local self government).
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general law under the third prong, the statute must “appl[y] to all parts of the state
alike.”200 The municipality may still adopt and enforce a local ordinance that covers
the same subject as a general law; it simply cannot adopt an ordinance that conflicts
with the general law.201
1. Cleveland’s Ordinance Conflicts with the Traffic Statutes of the Ohio Revised
Code
Under the Sokol test alone, Cleveland’s traffic cameras probably would not be
found to conflict with the traffic statutes of the Ohio Revised Code.202 On their face,
both the statutes and ordinances prohibit speeding.203 However, in a later case, the
Ohio Supreme Court went beyond the Sokol test. In Cleveland v. Betts the Court
struck down an ordinance that made conduct a misdemeanor that the state statute
ruled was a felony.204 The court began by reciting the Sokol test but then contended
“surely this test is not exclusive.”205 Although there was no conflict under Sokol, the
court determined that the ordinance did “contravene the expressed policy of the state
with respect to crimes by deliberately changing an act which constitutes a felony
under state law into a misdemeanor.”206 They then decided that this created the exact
type of conflict that the Constitution forbids.207 With Cleveland’s ordinance, the
conflict is even greater. Cleveland takes action that the state says is criminal and
turns it into a civil violation.208
A case decided by the Mahoning County Court of Appeals used the Betts test to
find conflict between an ordinance that made conduct criminal that the state law
classified as a civil violation.209 It relied partly on the Supreme Court’s decision in
Niles v. Howard, which restated the Betts proposition that a law that changed an
offense classified as a misdemeanor at state law to a felony at the municipal level
was unconstitutional.210 Under Niles, a city ordinance that increased the penalty
from a second to first-degree misdemeanor would be constitutional. The Ohio

200

Schneiderman v. Sesanstein, 167 N.E. 158, 159 (Ohio 1929).

201

Id.

202

Sokol, 140 N.E. at 521

203

Id.

204

Betts, 154 N.E.2d at 919

205

Id.

206

Id.

207

Id.

208

See discussion supra Part III.B.

209

State v. Rosa, 128 Ohio App. 3d 556, 561 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998) (holding that
Youngstown’s deceptive acts or practices ordinance was unconstitutional).
210
466 N.E.2d 539, 541 (Ohio 1984). The court explained that “[I]f the Niles ordinance
had altered the degree of punishment to a felony rather than a misdemeanor it would have
been unconstitutional. However, since the ordinance only increased the penalty from a lesser
misdemeanor to a first degree misdemeanor, it is not in conflict with the general laws of
Ohio.” Id.
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Supreme Court has followed this distinction in prior cases.211 In Toledo v. Best, the
court explained, “[w]here the only distinction between a state statute and a municipal
ordinance, proscribing certain conduct and providing punishment therefore, is to the
penalty only but not to the degree . . . of the offense, the ordinance is not in conflict
with the general law of the state.”212 Cleveland’s ordinances do not simply change
the degree of the offense, they change the basic classification of an offense from
criminal to civil.213 If a court found conflict between classifying a civil offense at
state law as a criminal offense at the municipal level,214 the inverse should also be
true and Cleveland’s ordinance conflicts with the Ohio Constitution.
The only traffic-related conduct that the State Legislature has authorized local
authorities to penalize as civil infractions are parking violations under Chapter 4521
of the Revised Code.215 The Legislature has not extended this practice to the
enforcement of traffic violations, and in fact, the only bill to propose such an action
failed to pass either house of the General Assembly.216 The logical inference that can
be drawn is that the Legislature did not want to give local authorities the ability to
enforce traffic violations civilly.217 Further support can be drawn from the fact that
House Bill 56, which both houses did pass, did not allow for civil enforcement of
moving traffic violations.218 It would only have allowed camera enforcement if a
police officer personally witnessed the event and wrote the ticket.219
The conflict appears very clear when considering the purpose behind the
Ohio Revised Code’s regulation of speeding offenses.220 The fact that the Ohio
Revised Code makes speeding a criminal offense, and more importantly assesses
points against an offender’s driving record, suggests that the purpose behind the
statutes are to make the roads safer for Ohio drivers.221 A speeding or red-light
violation, under the Revised Code, typically results in the assessment of two points
to a driver’s record.222 If a person accumulates twelve points within a two-year
211

See Toledo v. Best, 176 N.E.2d 520 (Ohio 1961).

212

Id. at 521.

213

See supra Part IV.B.

214

See Rosa, 128 Ohio App. 3d at 561.

215

See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4521.01-4521.10 (LEXISNEXIS 2006) (explaining the
powers of local authorities in establishing parking ordinances). Section 4521.02 states that a
local authority “may specify that a violation of the regulatory ordinance, resolution, or
regulation shall not be considered a criminal offense for any purpose.” Id. at § 4521.02.
216

See supra text accompanying Part IV C. (explaining that the General Assembly failed to
pass Bill 241, which would have allowed municipalities to adopt civil enforcement of traffic
violations).
217
This is an inference that the author has drawn. There is no source indicating the reasons
that House Bill did not pass.
218

See supra Part IV.C.

219

See supra Part IV.C.

220

See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4511.21.

221

Id.

222

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4510.036 (LEXISNEXIS 2006).
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period, their license is suspended by the state223 for a period of six months.224 The
obvious purpose of these statutes is to keep the roads safe from reckless drivers.225
Civil enforcement of speeding or red-light offense by means of a camera system does
little to make the roads safer, because it does not take violators off the road.226
An established canon of statutory interpretation is expressio unius est exclusio
alterius. This rule of interpretation stands for the proposition that a statute “which
provides that a thing shall be done in a certain way carries with it an implied
prohibition against doing that thing in any other way.”227 In the absence of evidence
of contrary legislative intent or policy, the method of enforcement listed in the
statute is presumed to be exclusive.228 One treatise on statutory construction explains
that “[l]egislative prescription of a specified sanction for noncompliance with
statutory requirements has been held to exclude the application of other sanctions.”229
The Ohio Supreme Court has applied this canon of statutory construction to home
rule cases.230 Therefore, the court has accepted this canon of construction, and it can
be applied to the Ohio Revised Code’s treatment of traffic offenses.231
When this canon is applied to Ohio’s laws on speeding and red-light violations, it
is clear that Cleveland’s traffic cameras conflict with the express will of the Ohio
Legislature and violates the Ohio Constitution. The fact that House Bill 241 (which
would have allowed the use of traffic cameras) was not passed by the Ohio
Legislature implies that legislators did not want to give municipalities the right to

223
Id. § 4510.037 (stating that if a driver receives more than 12 points in a two year period,
the registrar imposes a Class D suspension of his or her driver’s license).
224
Id. § 4510.02(B) (4) (LEXISNEXIS 2006) (stating that the period of time for a Class D
suspension is six months).
225

Id.

226

Id.

227

NORMAN J. SINGER, STATUTES
West 2000).

AND

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION ch. 46 (6th rev. ed.,

228

Id. at 314-15 (explaining that this rule is subordinate to the primary rule that it is the
intent of the legislature which governs a statute’s interpretation).
229

Id. at 314.

230

See State ex rel. Paluf v. Feneli, 630 N.E.2d 708, 712 (Ohio 1994). This case involved
a challenge to the Highland Heights City council’s refusal to confirm the mayor’s appointment
of Mr. Paluf to the position of city law director. Id. at 709. The court of appeals had relied on
expressio unius est exclusio alterius in holding that since the city’s charter specified that the
law director be admitted to the practice of law in Ohio, the citizens expressed an intent that
admittance to the practice of law be the only qualification necessary. Id. The court of appeals
further held that the city council could only refuse an appointment to law director if the
candidate was not admitted in Ohio. Id. The supreme court overturned the lower court’s
decision and held that the city council could refuse confirmation of Paluf for reasons beyond
the one specific requirement in the charter. Id. at 712-13. Although this case does not
mention red light cameras or conflict between a state law and a municipal ordinance, it
nonetheless signals the supreme court’s acceptance of this canon of constriction. See
generally id.
231

See generally id.
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enforce traffic violations as a civil penalty.232 Furthermore, the bill that the Ohio
Legislature actually passed, only to have it vetoed by the outgoing governor,
provides evidence that the use of these cameras runs contrary to the desire of the
state’s lawmakers.233 The O.R.C. explicitly states that speeding and red-light
offenses should be criminal violations, and makes no mention of civil penalties for
these offenses.234 The inclusion of these offenses as criminal violations for which
points are to be assessed to an offender’s driving record, necessarily excludes civil
enforcement. In fact, the only offense for which the O.R.C. allows municipalities to
enforce civilly, is parking violations.235 Only parking violations are able to be
enforced civilly, thus red-light and speeding violations must be enforced as criminal
violations. Since Cleveland’s ordinance attempts to enforce red-light and speeding
violations as civil offenses, it violated the express and implied pronouncement of the
Ohio Legislature on the subject. Thus, Cleveland’s ordinance is in conflict with the
Ohio Revised Code, and therefore violates Article XVIII of the Ohio Constitution.
2. Red-light Camera Ordinances are an Exercise of the Police Power by
Municipalities.
An important step in any home rule analysis is determining "whether the matter
in question involves an exercise of local self-government or an exercise of local
police power."236 In Village of Linndale v. State, the court noted that speeding laws
were an exercise of the state’s police power.237 It is clear that Cleveland’s traffic
cameras are an attempt to exercise the police power retained by the legislature of the
state.238 Cleveland is attempting to regulate the safety of its citizens on the city’s
streets and highways.239 This regulation of the police power would be valid if it did
not conflict with the state’s traffic laws because, as noted in Linndale, municipalities
can exercise their police power as long as there is no conflict between the statute and
the ordinance.240 As explained above, there is conflict between the state laws and
municipal ordinance.241 Therefore, the Ohio Supreme Court should find Cleveland’s
ordinance to be an unlawful exercise of the police power.242

232

See supra notes 141-45 and accompanying text.

233

See supra notes 145-63 and accompanying text.

234

See supra notes 127-28.

235

See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4521.01-4521.10 (LEXISNEXIS 2006)

236

Twinsburg v. State Emp. Relations Bd., 530 N.E.2d 26, 28 (Ohio 1988).

237

706 N.E.2d 1227, 1229 (Ohio 1999) (holding that the state law and the municipal
ordinance did not conflict, thus it was a valid exercise of the municipality’s police power).
238

See discussion supra Part IV.B.

239

See discussion supra Part IV.B.

240

706 N.E.2d at 1229.

241

See supra text accompanying notes 202-26.

242

See supra text accompanying notes 202-26.

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol55/iss4/10

26

2007]

SPEEDING TOWARDS DISASTER

633

3. State Traffic Statutes are General Laws
In Schneideman v. Sesanstein, the Ohio Supreme Court struck down a municipal
speeding ordinance as conflicting with a section of the Ohio General Code.243 The
court explained that general laws were enacted by the state legislature “to safeguard
the peace, health, morals, and safety, and to protect the property of the people of the
state.”244 The court explained that general laws apply uniformly to all parts of the
state.245 Most importantly, the court held that Ohio laws regulating speed limits were
general laws for purposes of the Home Rule Amendment.246 In a later case, the court
held that as a rule of law
[t]he words ‘general laws’ as set forth in Section 3 of Article XVIII of the
Ohio Constitution means statutes setting forth police, sanitary or similar
regulations and not statutes which purport only to grant or to limit the
legislative powers of a municipal corporation to adopt or enforce police,
sanitary or other regulations.247
Under this definition, a state speeding law criminalizing speeding violations is a
statute that sets forth police regulations.248 The key fact in support of this argument
is that speeding violations are a crime under the Revised Code.249 Local authorities
should be able to decide how to punish the crime, but should not be able to make
speeding a civil offense.
As the Trumbull County Court of Pleas explained in Moadus, “among the
‘steadfast parameters’ [the Supreme Court] had established for determining when a
law is a general law was that statutory schemes should be viewed ‘in their entirety,
rather than a single statute in isolation,’ with an eye toward determining whether the
statutes in question promoted ‘statewide uniformity.’”250 Viewed in their entirety,
the statutes in the Ohio Revised Code regulating the enforcement of traffic violations
243
167 N.E. 158, 161 (Ohio 1929) (holding that a municipal ordinance concerning speed
limits was in conflict with a state law).
244

Id. at 159.

245

Id. (“They apply to all parts of the state alike. Municipalities may adopt and enforce
local regulations covering the same subject so long and so far as the same are not in conflict
with general laws.”).
246
Id. The court noted that the speeding laws were “safety regulations enacted in the
interest of, and for the protection of, the public, and they definitely fix and prescribe the
standard of care that must be exercised in the operation of automobiles throughout the state.”
Id.
247
West Jefferson v. Robinson, 205 N.E.2d 382, paragraph three of the syllabus (Ohio
1965) (holding that a state law that prohibited municipalities from requiring licenses to sell
products was not a general law).
248

See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4511.21 (LEXISNEXIS 2006) (setting forth the speed
limits applicable to various highways and state routes and mandating that points be assessed
whenever a violation is more than five miles over the applicable speed limit).
249

Id. (explaining that a violation of this statute shall be classified as a misdemeanor).

250

Daniel Moadus, Jr. v. City of Girard, No. 05-CV-1927, 3 (Ct. Com. Pl. Trumbull
County July 6, 2006) (quoting City of Canton v. State, 766 N.E.2d 963, 966-67 (Ohio 2002)).
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are without question a matter of statewide authority. They set up a uniform system
of speed limits throughout the state and insist that violations of the statutes be
punished as misdemeanors.251 The statutes governing traffic violations do not
authorize the civil penalties. Since the Code is so explicit about the regulation of
traffic violations, it is difficult to make the argument that the City of Cleveland
should be able to determine how they should be enforced.
Last year, the Ohio Supreme Court handed down two important decisions on
home rule.252 The first, American Financial Services Association v. Cleveland, found
that a local ordinance that outlawed certain types of “predatory lending” violated the
Ohio Constitution.253 The second decision, Cincinnati v. Baskin, found no conflict
between a local ordinance on semi-automatic rifle possession and the state statute on
the same subject.254 These decisions may help predict how the current court would
handle a challenge to Cleveland’s traffic cameras. In American Financial Services,
the court dealt with a Cleveland ordinance that was stricter on predatory lending than
the state statute.255 The court explained the rationale behind the statewide-concern
doctrine and noted that a fundamental principle of Ohio law is that a municipality
may not infringe on a matter of general statewide concern.256 The court further noted
that the statewide concern doctrine falls within the second prong of the Canton
test.257 The court concluded that the General Assembly had expressed its intent to
preempt any municipal ordinances on predatory lending.258 The state’s statutes were

251

Id.

252

Am. Fin. Servs. Ass’n v. Cleveland, 858 N.E.2d 776 (Ohio 2006); Cincinnati v. Baskin,
859 N.E.2d 514 (Ohio 2006).
253
858 N.E.2d at 790 (holding that the section of the Ohio Revised Code dealing with
predatory lending expressly preempts local regulation of the practice).
254

859 N.E.2d at 519.

255

858 N.E.2d at 779. The court explained that Ohio passed a law (O.R.C. 1.63) in 2002
that required lenders to make certain disclosures to mortgagors on certain types of loans. Id.
Loans covered by the law had interest rates ten percentage points greater than the yield on
Treasury securities or had pints and fees that exceed eight percent of the loan or $400. Id.
The Cleveland ordinance prohibited loans with an interest rate between four and a half and
eight percentage points over Treasury securities and required balloon payments, excessive
financing, and increasing interest rates. Id. The eight district court of appeals certified two
questions to the Ohio Supreme Court: “I: Whether R.C. 1.63 is a general law for purposes of
Ohio’s home rule amendment. II: Under a home rule analysis, whether local predatory
lending ordinances that impose stricter requirements on lending transactions conflict with the
state’s predatory lending statues. Id. at 780.
256

Id. at 781. The court noted that state power is “retained in those areas where a
municipality would in no way be affected or where state dominance seemed to be required.”
Id. The question for Cleveland’s cameras is whether Ohio intended to retain this “exclusive
state power.” Id.
257

Id. at 782. “[C]ourts should consider the doctrine when deciding whether ‘the
ordinance is an exercise of local self government.” Id.
258

Id.
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found to be general laws, and Cleveland’s ordinances were in conflict and struck
down by the court.259
The court decided Baskin eighteen days later, upholding Cincinnati’s ordinance
and distinguishing its decision in American Financial Services.260 The court began
its analysis by nothing that the ordinances was an exercise of the police power, not
local self-government, and therefore could be struck down if it conflicted with a
general law.261 The court then established that the section of the O.R.C. in question
was a general law because it “prescribes a rule of conduct upon citizens
generally.”262 However, the court concluded that the statute was not in conflict under
the Sokol test, because it did not prohibit what the state permits.263 Interestingly,
neither case mentioned the test set forth in Betts.264 These cases will likely prove
crucial to an Ohio Supreme Court decision on traffic cameras, because they are the
court’s most recent statement on home rule.
VI. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, it is clear that the current use of traffic cameras
by the City of Cleveland violates the Home Rule Amendment, and should therefore
be struck down by the Ohio Supreme Court. The three-prong test from Canton
makes clear that they are unconstitutional.265 First, the ordinance conflicts with Ohio
statutes because they change the entire nature of the offense.266 Instead of being a
crime, and affording the accused the necessary rights under the constitution, the
Cleveland’s ordinances turn an offense into a civil penalty.267 Examining the history
of the red-light camera litigation in the General Assembly makes it clear that the
legislature has manifested an intent to keep traffic violations as a criminal offense.268
259
Id. at 784-86. Ultimately, the court struck the ordinances down using the Sokol test
because the ordinances sought to prohibit loans which the General Assembly had allowed. Id.
at 786.
260

Cincinnati v. Baskin, 859 N.E.2d 514, 519 (Ohio 2006) (explaining that Baskin is
distinguishable because the Cincinnati ordinance did not regulate or prohibit conduct
authorized by the state statute. Id.
261

Id. at 516-17.

262

Id. at 517 (stating that the statute met the Canton definition of a general law).

263

Id. at 519 (“In the absence of any limiting provision or declaration to the contrary, we
conclude that the General Assembly intended to allow municipalities to regulate the
possession of lower-capacity semiautomatic firearms in accordance with local conditions . . .
.”). The court then state that the General Assembly only required that municipalities not allow
possession of a semiautomatic firearm that could fire more than 31 rounds without reloading.
Id.
264

See generally Am. Fin. Servs. Ass’n v. Cleveland, 858 N.E.2d 776 (Ohio 2006);
Cincinnati v. Baskin, 859 N.E.2d 514 (Ohio 2006) (nowhere in either opinion is the Betts test
mentioned).
265

Canton, 766 N.E.2d at 966.

266

See supra text accompanying notes 202-26.

267

See supra text accompanying notes 129-38.

268

See supra text accompanying notes 139-72.
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It decided against passing legislation that would have allowed for civil enforcement
of traffic violation.269 Furthermore, it has only allowed civil enforcement of motor
vehicle laws in the area of parking laws.270 Under the second prong from Canton,
speed limits and traffic violations are clearly within the police power of the state.271
Finally, under the third prong of Canton, the traffic statutes of the Ohio Revised
Code are general laws.272 For these reasons, the Ohio Supreme Court should find
that municipal camera ordinances are unconstitutional in Ohio.
The City of Cleveland has a couple of options to deal with the problem raised by
this Note. One option would be simply to rid the city of its traffic cameras. Instead
of relying on cameras to generate revenue for the city’s budget gap, the city’s
administration could focus on developing alternative ways to raise revenue. This is
what Councilman Joe Cimperman originally suggested when the camera program
was proposed.273 This proactive approach would be the best option, because it would
demonstrate to the citizens of Cleveland that the government is addressing their
budgetary problems head-on and trying to find real solutions. Another option might
be to allow Cleveland’s voters to decide whether or not to retain the cameras in their
municipality, as the City of Steubenville, Ohio did this past November.274 An
overwhelming 76.2% of the town's citizens voted to ban the use of red-light cameras
in the town, following the trend of voters nationwide.275 In fact, any time a
municipality in the United States has been asked to vote on the use of camera
enforcement, the bill has been defeated.276 A final option would be simply to wait
until the Ohio Supreme Court hands answers the certified question from Mendenhall.
As this Note attempts to demonstrate, the relevant authority should lead the court to
conclude that traffic cameras violate the Home Rule Amendment of the Ohio
Constitution. This option would be the worst approach, because it would suggest an
inflexible city government that is slow to react and unoriginal in solving its
budgetary problems. Whichever option Cleveland takes, it is clear that its traffic
cameras violate the Ohio Constitution and must be removed.

269

See supra text accompanying notes 139-44.

270

See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4521.01-4521.10 (LEXISNEXIS 2006).

271

See supra text accompanying notes 236-42.

272

See supra text accompanying notes 243-64.

273

See supra note 13 and accompanying text.

274

See thenewspaper.com, Steubenville, Ohio Voters to Decide Speed Camera Fate,
http://www.thenewspaper.com/news/14/1411.asp (last visited Dec. 1, 2006) (stating that “[a]
'Yes' vote on Measure Ten will allow speed cameras to continue ticketing motorists and a 'No'
vote will cause the devices to be removed.”).
275

See thenewspaper.com, Steubenville, Ohio Voters Overwhelmingly Reject Speed
Cameras: Steubenville, Ohio becomes the fourth US community that has voted on and rejected
photo radar, http://www.thenewspaper.com/news/14/1433.asp (last visited Feb. 1, 2007)
(stating that the town's voters rejected against photo enforcement in a referendum on the city's
camera program).
276
Id. (stating that Steubenville is the fourth municipality nationwide to vote against
camera enforcement). The other cities are Batavia, Illinois; Peoria, Arizona; and Anchorage,
Alaska. Id.
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